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PRELIMINARY STATEMENT 
In this Brief, the Plaintiff and Appellant will be 
referred to as Gateway, The Defendant Nixon & Nixon, Inc. will 
be referred to as Nixon, and the Defendant: E. J. Nixon, Jr. 
will be referred to as E.J. A principal party to the chain of 
events leading to this case is John New & Associates, Inc., 
hereinafter referred to as New. References to the record on 
appeal will be designated "R". References to the Transcript of 
the trial will be designated lfTff. References to the transcript 
of the Gateway Motion to Re-open will be designated "MTR". All 
emphasis is added. 
JURISDICTION OF THE COURT 
Original jurisdiction is conferred upon the Supreme Court 
of the State of Utah pursuant to Section 78-2-2(3)(i), Utah 
Code Annotated 1953, as supplemented and amended. The Supreme 
Court exercised its discretion to transfer the appeal to the 
Utah Court of Appeals in accordance with Rule 4A of the Rules 
of the Utah Supreme Court and pursuant to 
Utah Code Annotated 1953, as supplemented 
Section 78-2-2(4), 
and amended. 
NATURE OF THE PROCEEDINGS BELOW 
The suit below was on a promissory no 
tried to a jury. At the close of Gateway* 
Gateway had rested, Nixon and E.J. moved f 
te. The case was 
s case and after 
or dismissal of 
-1-
Gateway's Complaint for failure of Gateway to prove that it 
was the owner and holder of the note sued upon. This motion 
was granted. This holding was affirmed on Gateway1s motion to 
re-open and for re-hearing. 
STATEMENT OF ISSUES PRESENTED FOR REVIEW 
Two (2) issues are presented to this Court for review. 
They are: 
1. Did Gateway prove at the trial by a preponderance of 
the evidence that it was the owner and holder of the Promissory 
Note sued upon. 
2. If Gateway proved at the trial by a preponderance of 
the evidence that it was the owner and holder of the Promissory 
Note sued upon, did Gateway prove by a preponderance of the 
evidence that said Promissory Note was due and payable. 
APPLICABLE CONSTITUTIONAL PROVISIONS, STATUTES, ETC. 
There are no constitutional provisions, statutes, 
ordinances, rules or regulations whose provisions are 
determinative of this case. 
STATEMENT OF THE CASE 
This case was tried to a jury in the District Court of 
Salt Lake County on February 4, 1987, the Honorable Frank G. 
Noel presiding. The suit by Gateway is to enforce payment 
-2-
of a promissory note. When Gateway rested 
and E.J. moved to dismiss Gateway's Compla 
that Gateway had not proven that it was th 
the Note, and the motion was granted. (T. 
its case, Nixon 
lint on the ground 
b owner and holder of 
20, lines 21 and 22) 
The Court reduced its Order of Dismissal to writing on February 
18, 1987. (R. 104) On February 27, 1987, 
alter or amend the Order of Dismissal. (R 
was heard and denied on October 9, 1987. 
Gateway moved to 
. 106) This motion 
(MTR. 32, lines 21-25 
New & Associates, Inc., 641 P.2d 144) A cipy of the Utah 
Supreme Court's Decision in the Nixon-New c^ ase is appended to 
this Brief. 
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5) A copy of this 
1 be referred to 
and R. 133) This appeal followed Judge Noel's denial of 
Gateway's Motion to Alter or Amend Order of Dismissal. 
On November 20, 1978, New as Seller and Nixon as Buyer 
entered into a written Agreement for the sale and purchase of 
real property in Weber County, Utah. (MTR 
Agreement is appended to this Brief and wi| 
hereinafter as the New-Nixon Agreement. 
New refused to perform the New-Nixon Agreement, and as a 
result Nixon filed suit against New in the 
Weber County for specific performance. Judge Calvin Gould 
presided over this trial and ruled in favor of New. The 
decision of Judge Gould was appealed to thi Utah Supreme 
Court and there was reversed. (Nixon & Nixon, Inc. vs. John 
District Court of 
The New-Nixon Agreement requires Nixon to execute a Note 
to New. (Paragraph 9) On remand from the Supreme Court, the 
District Court of Weber County decreed specific performance of 
the New-Nixon Agreement. Pursuant to this decree, the 
Promissory Note sued upon by Gateway was given by Nixon to New 
on December 30, 1983. (See Ex. 21-P and particularly the last 
paragraph on page 2 which states: "This note is given pursuant 
to the terms of a Judgment and Decree of the Honorable Calvin 
Gould entered December 26, 1983 in Civil Case #72745 in the 
District Court of Weber County, Utah, to which Judgment and 
Decree reference is made for the terms, provisions and 
conditions thereof.") The Nixon to New Note was admitted as 
Exhibit 21-P in the trial. A copy of the Nixon to New Note is 
appended to this Brief and will be referred to hereinafter as 
"the NoteM. 
In March 1986, Plaintiff filed suit against Nixon and E.J. 
in the District Court of Salt Lake County, alleging the 
execution of the Note and that: 
,f5. All conditions and conditions precedent have 
been performed or have occurred, or the performance or 
occurrence thereof has been waived and defendants are 
estopped from demanding or requiring their performance 
or ocurrence;" 
"6. On January 22, 1984, said agreement was duly 
assigned to the plaintiff and plaintiff is the present 
owner and holder thereof.tf (R. 2 and 3) 
Nixon and E.J. denied the allegations in paragraph 5 and 6 
of Gateway's Complaint. (R. 11) Thereafter, Gateway amended 
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its Complaint to change the specific date of the purported 
assignment to it of the Note to April 21, 1980. (R. 56, 
paragraph 6) The amended allegation was likewise denied by 
Nixon and E.J. (R. 62, paragraph 6) 
SUMMARY OF ARGUMENTS 
1. Nixon and E.J. contend that the Ndte is non-negotiable 
and that Gateway failed to prove at the trial that the Note had 
been transferred or assigned to Gateway, and that failing in 
such proof, Gateway was not the owner and folder of the Note 
and was not, therefore, entitled to sue on 
2. The Note by its terms is payable f1 
the maker (Nixon) files a final subdivision 
the property subject of the New-Nixon Agree 
then, the Note begins to accrue interest at| 
and the principal and interest on the Note 
after the filing of said subdivision plat, 
paragraphs 1, 2 and 3) Plaintiff failed tol 
that the subdivision plat has ever been filed or waived by 
Nixon, and without such proof, there is no 
was due when sued upon or at all. 
the Note. 
... six months after 
plat ..." against 
ment. If not paid 
eight percent (8%) 
|are due four years 
(See Ex. 21-P, 
prove at the trial 
evidence the Note 
ARGUMENT 
1. DID GATEWAY PROVE AT THE TRIAL Bff A PREPONDERANCE OF 
THE EVIDENCE THAT IT WAS THE OWNER AND HOLDER OF THE PROMISSORY 
r£ 
NOTE SUED UPON. 
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The Note is non-negotiable. The elements required to make 
an instrument negotiable are set forth in 70A-3-104, Utah Code 
Annotated, 1953 as amended, as follows: 
"(1) Any writing to be a negotiable instrument within 
this chapter must 
(a) be signed by the maker or drawer; and 
(b) contain an unconditional promise or order to 
pay a sum certain in money and no other 
promise, order, obligation or power given by 
the maker or drawer except as authorized by 
this chapter; and 
(c) be payable on demand or at a definite time; and* 
(d) be payable to order or to bearer." 
The Note fails the test of 70A-3-104, Utah Code Annotated, 
1953, in the following particulars: 
(a) The Note does not "contain an unconditional promise to 
pay a sum certain." The Note is for $53,071.27 and provides 
that from this sum the maker (Nixon) can offset (1) amounts 
necessary to remove liens from the property described in the 
Note, (2) the costs of clearing title to the said property, andv 
(3) the cost to Nixon of performing covenants to be performed 
by New under the terms of the New-Nixon Agreement. (Ex. 21-P, 
paragraphs A, B and C) The amount due on the Note cannot 
therefore be certain until the amounts of the offsets are 
determined. In addition, there is a condition to the payment 
of the Note, to-wit: the filing of a subdivision plat. 
The Note is not, therefore, an "unconditiohal order or 
promise to pay." 
) This denial put 
it admitted. Ex. 
29-P was objected to and its admission refused. (T. 9, lines 
16-18) There was no other evidence presen 
the Note had been assigned to it as allege^ in paragraph 6 of 
its Amended Complaint. 
or bearer." The 
Inc., a Utah 
(b) The Note is not payable "to orderl 
Note is payable "to John New & Associates,! 
Corporation." (Ex. 21-P, paragraph 1) 
In its Amended Complaint, Gateway alleged that, "On April 
21, 1980 said agreement (the Note) was duly assigned to the 
Plaintiff ..." (R. 57) This allegation was denied by Nixon and 
E.J. in their Answer. (R. 63, paragraph 6 
the burden on Gateway to prove the assignment. 
Gateway undertook to prove the assignment to it of the 
Note by introducing three (3) exhibits. The first was Ex. 
20-P, which on its face is an assignment of 
property as therein described from New to Gateway. No mention 
is made in the assignment of the Note. A popy of this 
Assignment is appended to this Brief. 
Gateway also attempted to offer two (j 
one as Ex. 19-P and the other as Ex. 29-P. 
objected to and the objection sustained. 
15) No further attempts were made to have | 
f) Quit Claim Deeds, 
Ex. 19-P was 
(T. 6, lines 14 and 
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The only other evidence on the ownership of the Note by 
Gateway was this testimony of Carl Lee Gall, President of 
Gateway: 
"Q. (By Mr. Hunt) Did you receive that Promissory 
Note from John New & Associates when it was delivered to 
them? 
"A. Yes. (T. 7, lines 17-19) 
ffQ. (By Mr. Hunt) You did receive that from John 
New & Associates? 
... 
"A. Yes. (T. 8, lines 1-7) 
Gateway did not argue at the trial that it was the owner 
of the Note by any means other than the assignment (Ex. 20-P) 
or the proferred and refused Quit Claim Deeds (Exs. 19-P and 
29-P). In its Brief, Gateway argues that the mere fact Gateway 
had possession of the Note vested legal title to the Note in 
Gateway. (Appellant's Brief, page 5) 
It is admitted that there is dicta in Utah cases to the 
effect that a non-negotiable note may be assigned by parol. 
However, even under such dicta, there must be some parol 
evidence to show the assignment. In this case, there was none. 
Gateway's sole evidence of ownership of the Note was its 
possession of the same. It offered no evidence as to how it 
obtained such possession. Gateway alleged a specific 
assignment, giving the exact date thereof, to-wit: April 21, 
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1980. (R. 56, paragraph 6) Nixon and E.Jl denied this 
allegation, thereby putting Gateway on its proof of the 
allegation. Gateway offered no proof of t$e alleged 
assignment. 
The rule of law on parol assignments is stated thusly in 
10 C.J.S. on Bills and Notes §227: 
"A valid assignment may be made by woitds or acts which 
fairly indicate an intention to make the assignee the 
owner. Such assignment may be in writing, and formal or 
informal, but it must show, in some manner, a making over 
of the right or interest therein a£ distinguished from a 
mere delivery of possession.'1 
and in 11 Am. Jur. 2nd on Bills and Notes §275, it is 
stated, "But there is more to delivery than merely parting with 
possession; there must also be the intention to give effect to 
the instrument." 
In Leverett v. Awnings Inc., (GA) 104 
Court held there must be intention to pass 
The Oregon Supreme Court in Schumann v. Bank of 
California, N.A., 233 P. 860, held that assignment of a 
non-negotiable chose in action may be affected by assent of the 
assignor and assignee, accompanied by delivery of the chose in 
action. 
SE 2nd 686, the 
title. 
Midstate Homes, Inc. v, Hockenberger, I 
and Glenn v. Lukenbill, (Kan) 389 P.2d 792, 
page 5 of its Brief, are inappropriate as both cases dealt with 
negotiable instruments, whereas the Note in| 
non-negotiable. Clearly a negotiable note 
(Kan) 389 P.2d 760, 
cited by Gateway at 
this case is 
is transferable by 
-9-
delivery without endorsement. (70A-3-202(1), Utah Code 
Annotated, 1953 as amended and supplemented) In both the 
Hockenberger and Lukenbill (supra.), the assignment was in fact 
in writing and the statements therein that an assignment could 
be by parol are dicta. Moreover, even if the dicta is accepted 
as the law of the case, the ruling does not obviate the 
requirement of proving the oral assignment. 
The cases of Thatcher et al. v. Merriam et al., (Ut) 240 
P.2d 266, Johnson v. Beickey, (Ut) 43 P. 189, and O'Conner v. 
Slatter, (Ut) 93 Pac. 1078, cited by Gateway at pages 6 and 7 
of its Brief, are not dispositive of this case. These three 
(3) cases recite as dicta that a note may be asssigned by 
parol. However, in all three (3) cases, there was, in fact, a 
written assignment of the notes in question. The statement is 
repeated in Am. Jur. 2nd on Bills, Notes, in the Utah case of 
Thatcher (ibid.) and in various other cases that a 
non-negotiable note may be transferred by parol. But counsel 
has been unable to find a single case where a court has 
actually considered a non-negotiable note assigned without a 
written endorsement or assignment in support of the proposition 
that a non-negotiable note can be assigned by parol. In short, 
the dicta that a non-negotiable note can be transferred by 
parol does not appear to be supported by any case law where 
there was in fact no written endorsement or assignment. On the 
other hand, in the case of Ball v. Hill, (Tex) 38 Tex. 237, the 
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Texas Supreme Court held that "possession df a 
gnment, is no 
that the dicta in 
fact stands for the 
be transferred by 
the assignment by 
not just whether a 
non-negotiable note, without a written assij 
evidence of ownership/1 Assuming arguendo 
Thatcher, Johnson and 0'Conner (supra.) in 
proposition that a non-negotiable note can 
parol, there is still the requirement that 
parol be proven. The point in this case isl 
non-negotiable note can be transferred by parol and without 
written endorsement or assignment, but whether there was any 
parol evidence (or any evidence of any kind 
that there was an assignment of the Note from New to Gateway. 
Gateway alleged assignment to it of the Note on a specific 
date, to-wit: April 21, 1980. The assignment was denied by 
Nixon and E.J. in their Answer. This denial 
proof of the allegation by a preponderance 
Gateway failed to prove that by parol or otherwise on the date 
of the alleged assignment, to-wit: April 2 
New assigned the Note to Gateway. It is si 
assignment, which is Ex. 20-P, is dated Aprj 
date Gateway alleges the Note was assigned 
for that matter) 
1 put Gateway on its 
of the evidence. 
1, 1980, or at all, 
[gnificant that the 
il 21, 1980, the 
to it, and it is 
apparent that Gateway relies on this assignment to establish 
its ownership of the Note. If not, why did 
put on parol or other evidence of the assignment to it of the 
Note? One can only conclude it was because 
evidence of such an assignment. And the as 
Gateway not simply 
there was not other 
^ignment which is 
-11-
Ex. 20-P is clearly not an assignment of the Note. It is 
an assignment of real property and makes no reference whatever 
to the Note or any other chose in action. 
Nixon and E.J. submit there was no evidence of the 
assignment of the Note to Gateway, written or parol; that 
Gateway therefore failed in its burden of showing ownership of 
the Note, and failing to show ownership of the Note, Gateway 
had no right to sue thereon. 
2. IF GATEWAY PROVED AT THE TRIAL BY A PREPONDERANCE OF 
THE EVIDENCE THAT IT WAS THE OWNER AND HOLDER OF THE PROMISSORY 
NOTE SUED UPON, DID GATEWAY PROVE BY A PREPONDERANCE OF THE 
EVIDENCE THAT SAID PROMISSORY NOTE WAS DUE AND PAYABLE• 
The Note states on its face as follows: 
"1. The principal amount of this Note shall be paid 
six months after the Maker hereof files a final subdivi-
sion plat for the following described property in Weber 
County, Utah: 
(here follows legal description) 
"2. In the event this Note is not paid within six 
(6) months after filing of the aforesaid subdivision plat, 
the amount remaining unpaid on the date six (6) months 
after filing said subdivision plat shall bear interest 
from and after the date six (6; months after filing said 
subidivision plat at the rate of Eight percent (8%; per 
annum until paid. 
ff3. Any amounts of principal and interest not sooner 
paid on this Note within four (4) years after filing the 
aforesaid subdivision plat shall be due on a date four (4) 
years after filing said subdivision plat and if not then 
said Payee may proceed according to law." (Ex. 21-P) 
-12-
In its Amended Complaint, Gateway all 
"5. All conditions and conditio 
eged that: 
ns precedent which 
would render said agreement due and payable have been 
performed or have occurred, or the pe 
occurrence thereof has been waived an 
estopped from demanding or requiring 
occurrence;" (R. 57) 
rformance or 
a defendants are |their performance or 
This allegation was denied by Nixon and E.J. (R. 63, 
|ts proof by a 
conditions precedent 
paragraph 6) This denial put Gateway on i 
preponderance of the evidence that (1) all 
have been performed or occurred, or (2) that performance of 
such conditions have been waived, or (3) tnat Nixon is estopped 
from demanding or requiring this performance. 
Gateway did not put on any evidence tnat a subdivison plat 
had ever been filed on the property described in the Note. 
Gateway did not put on any evidence that the filing of the 
subdivision plat had been waived by Nixon and E.J. Gateway did 
not put on any evidence that would show Ni 
requiring performance of the conditions precedent, to-wit: the 
filing of the subdivision plat. Gateway h^ td the burden of 
proving the Note was due. It is axiomate 
cause of action on a note until it is due. 
Code Annotated, 1953 as amended, provides 
action against a maker ... accrues (a) in 
instrument on the day after maturity.ff Gal 
burden of proving the Note even matured and had no cause of 
action on the Note until ". . . the day after it matured.11 
(70A-3-122(l), Utah Code Annotated, 1953 ai amended) 
that there is no 
70A-3-122(l), Utah 
that f,A cause of 
the case of a time 
teway failed in its 
-13-
It should be noted that this point was not raised in 
argument to the Trial Court. The reason for such failure was 
that the Trial Court dismissed Gateway's Complaint on Nixon and 
E.J.'s first argument, making it moot to raise the second 
argument. However, if this Court for any reason finds 
Gateway's action should not have been dismissed for the reasons 
argued in point 1 of this Brief, this Court can and should find 
that Gateway, after presenting all of its evidence and resting, 
did not prove the condition precedent to the Note being due and 
Gateway did not therefore prove its cause of action. 
CONCLUSION 
Gateway put on no evidence of the Note being assigned to 
it. Had there been such evidence, it surely would have been 
offered by Gateway. The assignment, Ex. 20-P, was not evidence 
the Note had been assigned by New to Gateway and is the only 
evidence offered by Gateway that the Note was assigned to it. 
And in any event, even if the Note was assigned to it as 
alleged, Gateway failed to prove the condition precedent to the 
Note being due, to-wit: the recording of the subdivision plat 
or the waiver by Nixon of this condition, by a preponderance of 
the evidence, or at all. The dismissal of Gateway's case was 
proper and should be affirmed by this Court. 
-14-
DATED this 7th day of July, 1988. 
Respectfully submitted, 
OLSON & HOGGAN 
L. Brent Ho 
Attorneys f 
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EXHIBIT A 
A G R E E M - E N ' T 
Agreement made this 10 day of November, 1978, between 
JOHN NEW and ASSOCIATES, INC., a Utah corporation, hereinafter 
referred to as Seller and NIXON and NIXON INC., a Utah corpora-
tion, hereinafter referred to as Buyer. 
RECITALS 
1. Seller has right title and interest to certain rea 
property described more particularly in Exhibit M.AH, made a 
part'hereof by this reference. 
2. Buyer desires to purchase the same for the purpose 
of building a subdivision. 
Now therefore it is agreed and covenanted between 
the parties as follows: 
1. Buyers will pay the redemption price necessary to 
redeem the property and interest of John New and Associates in 
the approximate sum of Seventy Six Thousand Nine Hundred 
Twenty Eight Dollars and Seventy-Three Cents ($76<928 .73). 
2. Buyer shall convey to Seller title to the describe 
property, free and clear of all liens and shall provide for 
Buyer a policy of title insurance, insuring the title of 
Buyer. 
3. Buyer shall use best efforts to prepare a sub-
division plat and proceed with engineering and development of 
the property at a commercially reasonable speed. 
4. Six months from the filing of the final plat, 
Buyer shall pay to Seller the difference between the redemption 
price paid initially and One Hundred and Thirty Thousand Dollar 
($130,000.00) . 
5. In the event, it becomes necessary to fence or 
realign the millstream creek, in order to meet F.H.A. standards 
and approval for funding, such realignment or fencing will be 
EXHBIT "A" 
7 
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done by Seller at Seller's expense or if Seller is unible to 
do the necessary work within Thirty days from written notice, 
Buyer may do work and deduct the expense from the purchase 
price. 
6. In the event, any assessments, liens or encumbrances 
that exist or are subsequently disclosed to exist at the time of 
this agreement that necessitate uxtia payments from Buyer to 
develop the subdivision, such sums shall be deducted from the 
balance of the purchase price owed Seller by Buyer. 
7. Buyer shall make all normal improvements and meet 
all normal improvement costs, associated with development of 
the property. 
8. In the event, Buyer does not pay Seller t|he amount 
of money due and payable six months from the filing of| the final 
subdivision plat, the amount of money then due and owi|ng shall 
bear interest at the rate of Eight percent (8^). 
9. Buyer shall execute a note in favor of Selller 
consistant with the terms of this agreement. In the event, 
Buyer has not paid the Seller the amounts due and payable here 
under within four years from the filing of final plat, 
shall be in default and Seller may proceed according to law 
10. The Buyer has the option to require Selle^r to 
purchase the 2.45 acres described in exhibit "A" as parcel two, 
at the sum of Fifteen Thousand r j ve Hundred Eighty Nme| Dollars 
and Eight Two Cents ($15,589.82). This sum represents|the re-
purchase price of the 2.45 acres. It is the intent of|the 
parties that the option to require Seller to rebuy shall bear 
the identica1 price per acre that Buyer pays to Seller! In 
the event, there are adjustments in the purchase price due to 
expenses incurred with realignment or fencing of the mjllstream 
creek, or in the event, there are unknown liens or assessments/ 
these adjustments are to be reflected in the price required of 
Seller for repurchasing the 2.45 acres. Buyer must exdrcise 
this right within six months after filing of the tinal plat. 
the note 
J L . 8 
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11. In the event, Buyer sells' the property, the note to 
Seller will become due and payable. 
1 2 . It is the intent of the parties to meet F.H.A. 
requirements for financing. If there are any extraordinary 
F.H.A. requirements beyond Ogden City requirements, Seller 
may be required to pay these additional costs up to Seven 
Thousand Five Hundred Dollars ($7, !>00.00) . In the event, 
Buyer determines the development is untenable, Buyer may requin 
Seller to rebuy the property for One Hundred Thousand Dollars 
($100^000.00). 
13. Time is of the essence to this agreement. 
DATED this 2 0 day of November, 1978. 
NIXON and NIXON INC., 
8 r>^>^ BiU ! 
K. J. Ni>»n 
JOHN NEW and ASSOCIATES 
HK'XLJL 
John New, President 
: os 
STATE OF UTAH ) 
COUNTY OF WERI2R J 
On the 20 day of November, 1978, personally appeared 
before me John New, who being duly sworn did say that he is the 
President of John New and Associates and that said instrument 
was signed in behalf of said John New and Associates, by 
authority of its bylaws and said John New acknowledged to mo 
that said John New and Associates executed the same. /' 
( -'7 t' < 
NOTARY PUDLIC ' s" / 
Residing aL :.' f '-/•'. -
 y <•(< 
My Commission Expire:;: $/(i /)?r 
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STAn: 01 in AH ) 
COUNTY OF WLULK ) 
On the day of November , 1978, personally appeared 
before me E. J. Nixon , who beiny ddly sworn did 
say that he is an otticer of NJXOM and Nixon Inc., and that 
said instrumonL was signed in bch.il £ ot .said Nixon and Nixon 
Inc., by authority of its bylaws and said U. J. Nixon 
acknowledcjed to me that said Nixon dnd Nixon Inc I, executed 
the same. 
NOTARY PUBLIC 71 * 
Uotudmq at: /
 # , / f ft' 
My Commission L x p i r e s : <l/" /$*/ 
- 1 9 -
UXHiBIT A 
PARCEL 1,1 
Part of the Southwest Quarter of Section 17, and the Southeast Quarter of 
Section 18, Township 6 North, Range I West, Salt Lake Base and Meridian, 
U.S, Survey! Beginning at a point on Ogden City Coordinates North 209+99.**9, 
East ^5>90.^5 on the East right-of-way line of .the Oregon Short Line Railroad, 
said point given as 13.30 chains West and 79.2 feet North of the* Southeast 
corner of said Section 18; and running thence North 1°3Q' East 620,00 feet and 
North 0°29'30M East ¥*6.**3 feet along said railroad right-of-way to Ogden City 
Coordinates North 220*65.85, East ^5>92.52 (being the centerline of 7th Street 
extended), thence South 89 09,^5" East 809.38 feet to the East line of Section 
18 (Ogden City Coordinates North 220+67.68, East 5^01.97), thence South 0°50,15M 
West 33 feet; thence South 89°09,^5M East 198.0 feet; thence South 0°58,30M West 
822.73 feet to a fence corner; thence North 6^°00' West 718.19 feet; thence South 
25°09,15" West 282.80 feet along fence; thence South 3°35,09' West 258.05 feet; 
thence North 89°17,t*9M West 231.0 feet to the point of beginning. 
PARCEL 2t 
Part of the Southeast Quarter of Section 18, Township 6 North, Range 1 West, Salt 
Lake Meridian, U.S. Surveyt Beginning at a point North 0°58,3^« East 11*0.57 feet 
and North 89 09fi*5M West ^$5.1* feat from the Southeast corner of said Quarter Sec-
tion; Mr\d running thence North 89 09'^5" West 353.98 feet to the East line of Orqgon 
Shortline Railroad right-of-wayj thence North along said right-of-way line ^55 feet, 
more or less, to the center of Mill Creek; thence South 6^°53* East 88.8 feet along 
said center of Mill Creek; thence Southeasterly alonrj a channel of said Mill Creek 
to the point of beginning. 
-20-
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[7, 8] Appellant argues that she was not 
bound to perform because the closing was 
not held on the September 1, 1980, date 
fixed in the earnest money agreement 
The general rule with regard to contracts 
for the sale of land is that time is not of the 
essence unless the parties expressly indicate 
otherwise or the circumstances surrounding 
the transaction necessarily imply that the 
parties intended timeliness of performance 
to be of paramount concern. Hing Bo Gum 
v. Nakamura, 57 Hawaii 39, 549 P.2d 471 
(1976); Ficke v. Alaska Airlines, Inc., Alas-
ka, 524 P.2d 271, 277-78 & n. 4 (1974); 
Russell v. Ferrell, 181 Kan. 259. 311 P.2d 
347 (1957); Dillard v. Ceaser, 206 Okla. 304. 
243 P.2d 356 (1952); Loyd v. Southwest 
Underwriters, 50 N.M. 66, 169 P.2d 238 
(1946). In this case, the record contains no 
evidence that the parties intended time to 
be of the essence in the performance of the 
earnest money agreement. The terms of 
the agreement do not so state, such as by 
requiring a forfeiture of the deposit or an 
avoidance of the contract if the deadline 
were not met. Appellant makes no show-
ing that she would have suffered irrepara-
ble harm if the property were not closed on 
the stated date. Indeed, her own delaying 
actions indicate otherwise. 
[9] Parties to a contract are obliged to 
proceed in good faith and to cooperate in 
the performance of the contract in accord-
ance with its expressed intent One party 
cannot by willful act or omission make it 
impossible or difficult for the other to per-
form and then invoke the other's nonper-
formance as a defense. Ferris v. Jennings, 
Utah, 595 P.2d 857, 859 (1979); Zions Prop-
erties, Inc. v. Holt, Utah, 538 P.2d 1319, 
1321 (1975). The court did not err in re-
quiring appellant to execute the documents 
necessary to close the sale or in later autho-
rizing another to do so. 
The orders appealed from are affirmed. 
Costs to respondent 
HALL, C. J., STEWART and HOWE, and 
RONALD 0. HYDE. District Judge, concur. 
NIXON AND NIXON, I N C Plaintiff 
and Appellant, 
v. 
JOHN NEW ft ASSOCIATES, I N C 
Defendant and Respondent 
No. 16989. 
Supreme Court of Utah. 
Jan. 28, 1982. 
Purchaser filed an action seeking spe-
cific performance of a contract to purchase 
real estate. The Second District Court, 
Weber County, Calvin Gould, J., found that 
the contract was too vague for specific per-
formance. Appeal was taken. The Su-
preme Court, Stewart, J., held that the fail-
ure to specify the time for performance by 
the vendor did not render the contract too 
vague to be specifically enforced in favor of 
the purchaser. 
Reversed and remanded. 
1. Contracts «=» 147(1) 
Contracts are to be consumed in light 
of reasonable expectations of parties as evi-
denced by purpose and language of con-
tract. 
2. Contracts *»9(1) 
Contract need not provide for every 
collateral matter or possible contingency. 
3. Specific Performance *428(3) 
Failure to specify time for performance 
by vendor in contract for purchase of real 
estate did not preclude specific performance 
in favor of purchaser since, when no time is 
agreed upon, general rule requires comple-
tion within reasonable time under all cir-
cumstances, and, therefore, agreement was 
sufficiently certain in its essential terms 
and obligations and rights of parties were 
adequately defined to support specific per-
formance. 
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NIXON AND NIXON, INC. v. 
Cite a*. Uuh 
L. Brent Hoggan of Olson, Hoggan & 
Sorcnson, Logan, for plaintiff and appel-
lant. 
Richard Richards, Ogden, for defendant 
and respondent. 
STEWART, Justice: 
Plaintiff, Nixon and Nixon, Inc. (the 
"Nixons"), purchaser of real estate, sought 
specific performance of a contract to pur-
chase approximately twenty acres of unde-
veloped real estate located in Weber Coun-
ty, Utah. The trial court found the con-
tract too vague for specific performance 
without specifying which provision or provi-
sions were faulty for that reason. Judg-
ment was entered restoring the parties to 
their status before the agreement Plain-
tiff appeals. 
John New, seller, had previously mort-
gaged the property to Commercial Security 
Bank. After his default on the mortgage, 
the bank foreclosed the mortgage on the 
property. On November 20, 1978, the last 
day of the six-month redemption period, 
Nixon & Nixon, Inc., a real estate develop-
ment corporation, agreed to buy the proper-
ty for $130,000. Jack Nixon and his father, 
Ezra J. Nixon, Sr., were the principal stock-
holders of the plaintiff, Nixon & Nixon, Inc. 
Pursuant to an agreement between the 
Nixons and John New, the Nixons initially 
paid the bank $76,928.73, the amount neces-
sary to redeem defendant's foreclosed prop-
erty. Also, Nixon contracted to prepare a 
subdivision plat and to proceed with engi-
neering and development of the property at 
a commercially reasonable speed, to pay the 
difference between the purchase price and 
the redemption price six months from the 
final plat filing, and to make all normal 
improvements and pay all normal improve-
ment cosU associated with the property de-
velopment. If Nixon did not pay New & 
Associates the amount due and payable six 
months from the filing of final subdivision 
plat, the money then due and owing was to 
bear interest at the rate of 8%. The con-
tract further provided that if Nixon did not 
pay New & Associates the contract price 
within four years from filing of the final 
JOHN NEW & ASSOCIATES Utah 145 
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plat, "the note shall be in default and New 
& Associates may proceed according to 
law." 
New & Associates' duties were to convey 
title to the described property clear of all 
liens; to provide the Nixons a policy of title 
insurance insuring the buyer's title; to be 
responsible for the realignment or fencing 
of the Millstream Creek if it proved neces-
sary, or if the work were not done within 
the specified time, to permit the Nixons to 
do the work and deduct the expenses from 
the purchase price. Nixons were to be re-
sponsible for any extraordinary FHA re-
quirements beyond Ogden City require-
ments of up to $7,500. The contract al-
lowed the Nixons to require John New to 
repurchase the property for $100,000 in the 
event the Nixons determined that develop-
ment was practical. 
Jack Nixon contacted surveyors and engi-
neers and had initial sketches drawn as 
preliminary steps. As of May 1979, how-
ever, he had made no improvements on the 
property. At trial he explained why devel-
opment had not commenced. According to 
him, the death of Ezra Nixon caused an 
initial setback in the project and the onset 
of the winter months created conditions not 
conducive to the development and improve-
ment of raw ground. More importantly, 
the evidence established that it would be 
commercially unfeasible for a buyer to sub-
divide and improve a raw piece of property 
before clear title was tendered. Aa-of-May 
1979, despite a contract term making time 
of the essence, New had not tendered a 
deed of clear title. That same month, Jack 
Nixon discovered that New, on his own, had 
begun to subdivide the property. 
Jack Nixon testified he was ready, will-
ing, and able to execute a note in accord-
ance with the terms of the contract but 
that he had not received a deed or a title 
insurance policy from defendant as required 
by the* contract Mr. Hughes, New's attor-
ney, also testified that property develop-
ment and the expenditure of large sums of 
money could not reasonably be expected 
until clear title was tendered. 
- 2 2 -
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In holding for New & Associates on the 
ground that the contract was too vague to 
be enforceable, the court did not delineate 
any specific ambiguity. The sole finding on 
ambiguity is in the following language: 
[t]he contract is so ambiguous that the 
rights of the defendant cannot be as-
certained or enforced except at the whim 
or caprice of the plaintiff, and to enforce 
the contract as the plaintiff now requests 
would be to deprive the defendant of any 
equity he may have had in the property. 
[1-3] Contracts are to be construed in 
light of the reasonable expectations of the 
parties as evidenced by the purpose and 
language of the contract A contract need 
not provide for every collateral matter or 
possible contingency. Reed v. Alvey, Utah, 
610 P.2d 1374 (1980); Pitts v. Marsh, 222 
Kan. 586, 567 P.2d 843 (1977). In the in-
stant case, there is no claim the contract is 
uncertain as to parties, subject matter, or 
consideration. Failure to specify time for 
performance will not preclude specific en-
forcement since when no time is agreed 
upon, the general rule requires completion 
within a reasonable time under all circum-
stances. Ferris v. Jennings, Utah, 595 P.2d 
857 (1979). In light of John New's failure 
to tender a document of title to Jack Nixon, 
there is no merit in the argument that 
Nixon did not proceed in good faith in 
performing the contract. Under estab-
lished principles of law, the agreement was 
sufficiently certain in its essential terms 
and the obligations and rights of the parties 
were adequately defined to support specific 
performance. Reed v. Alvey, supra. 
Because the only issue argued was the 
vagueness of the contract, we decline to 
comment on any other aspects of the con-
troversy between the parties, and leave all 
other matters to the trial court. Reversed 
and remanded for further proceedings. 
Costs to appellant 
HALL, C. J., and HOWE and OAKS, JJ., 
concur. 
MAUGHAN, J., heard arguments but 
died before the opinion was filed. 
STATE of Utah, Plaintiff and 
Respondent 
Serhio H. GONZALES, Defendant 
and Appellant 
N(J. 17657. 
Supreme Court of Utah. 
Jan. 129, 1982. 
Defendant was! convicted in the Second 
District Court, Davis County, Douglas L. 
Cornaby, J., of attempted rape on an eight-
year-old minor, and he appealed. The Su-
preme Court held that: (1) defendant's ap-
pointed counsel was not incompetent, and 
(2) other claims did not rise to degree of 
prejudiciality that would warrant reversal. 
Affirmed. 
Howe, J., con^rred in result and filed 
opinion. 
lesser 
1. Criminal Law 
Hindsight indicated 
taken his appointed 
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641.13(5) 
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PROMISSORY NOTE 
For value received NIXON & NIXON, INC., a Utah Corporation 
agrees to pay to JOHN NEW & ASSOCIATES, INC., a Utah Corporation, 
at such place as Payee may in writing direct and in lawful money 
of the United States of America, the sum of $53,071.27 as 
follows: 
1. The principal amount of this Note shall be paid six 
months after the Maker hereof files a final subdivision plat for 
the following described property in Weber, County, Utah: 
Part of the Southwest Quarter of Section 17, and the 
Southeast Quarter of Section 18, Township 6 North, Range 1 
West, Salt Lake Base and Meridian, U.S. Suvrey: Beginning 
at a point on Ogden City Coordinates North 209+99.49, East 
45+90.45 on the East right of way line of the Oregon Short 
Line Railroad, said point given as 13.30 chains West and 
79.2 feet North of the Southeast corner of said Section 18; 
and running thence North l°30f East 620.00 feet and North 
0°29,30n East 446.43 feet along said railroad right of way 
to Ogden City Coordinates North 220+65.85, East 45+92.52 
(being the centerline of 7th Street extended), thence South 
89o09f45f, East 809.38 feet to the East line of Section 18 
Ogden City Coordinates North 220+65.68, East 54+01.97), 
thence South O^O'lS" West 33 feet; thence South 89o09'45" 
East 198.0 feet; thence South 0°58'30" West 822.73 feet to a 
fence corner; thence North 64°00f West 718.19 feet; thence 
South 25°09f15u West 282.80 feet along fence; thence South 
3°35,09" West 258.05 feet; thence North 89°17,49H West 231.0 
feet to the point of beginning. 
2. In the event this Note is not paid within six (6) months 
after filing of the aforesaid subdivision plat, the amount 
remaining unpaid on the date six (6) months after filing said 
subdivision plat shall bear interest from and after the date six 
(6) months after filing said subdivision plat at the rate of 
Eight percent (8%) per annum until paid. 
3. Any amounts of principal and interest not sooner paid on 
this Note within four (4) years after filing the aforesaid 
subdivision plat shall be due on a date four (4) years after 
filing said subdivision plat and if not then said Payee may 
proceed according to law: 
Payee may, at its option: 
A. Pay any sums necessary to remove liens and encumbrances 
against the property described above, to the extent such liens 
•24-
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and encumbrances are placed against title to 
acts or neglect of Payee or those claiming by, under or through 
Payee or were against title to said property 
1978, and may deduct the amount so paid from 
Note. 
said property by the 
on November 20, 
the amount of this 
B. Take such action to clear title to the property 
described in paragraph 1 above of liens and encumbrances of 
record against said property on November 20, 1978, or placed 
thereon by the acts or by reason of the neglect of Payee or those 
claiming by, under or through Payee and deduct the expenses and 
costs incurred by Maker in so doing from the [amount of this 
Note. 
C. Perform any covenant to be performed 
terms of that certain Agreement dated Novemb^ 
Payee herein as Seller and Maker herein as 
cost and expense of doing so from the amount 
by Payee by the 
r 20, 1978 between 
Bijyer and deduct the 
of this Note. 
This Note is given pursuant to the terms of a Judgment and 
Decree of the Honorable Calvin Gould entered 
in Civil Case #72745 in the District Court off Weber County, Utah, 
December 26 1983 
to which Judgment and Decree reference is maq 
provisions and conditions thereof. 
e for the terms, 
DATED this 30th day of December 1983. 
NIXON & NIXOI^  
C. 
INC. 
., President 
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ASSIGNMENT 
KNOW ALL, m^N BY THESE PRESENTS: 
That the underpinned for and in consideration of the sum of 
T O and n n / 1 0 n =^_— : (S10 .00) noium, 
paid by_ 
of 
.-GA-T^WA-Y~D-EV-ELaP^l£HXXOM£ANY- . 
OGDEN County »f. WEBER , State of 
JJXAJL . , receipt whereof id hereby acknowledged, ha sold, assigned, and trans-
ferred and by these presents do sell, assign and transfer unto the said .GATEWAY 
DEVELOPMENT COMPANY 
Part o 
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IN WITNESS WHEREOF, _ L 
of A p r i l
 r 198Q , 
. have hereunto signed-. £ v name. . this * * _ day 
JOHN \rEW / N D ASSOCIATES , INC-
STATE OF_ ULA, 
SECRETARY TREASURE 
COUNTY OF. .S*L 
On thu £~\ ~ .day of. •M'rWv 1 9 * 0 . personally appeared before me 
the sivn»*r_
 0f the above instrument who duly acknowledged to me t f b t - H ^ executed the * 
-B^ M Notary Public 
Residing" at 
M> A^)mmis*ion expires: 
rOHM U 5 - A 4 H O N M C N T UONG FOHM —«CCLT CO \% . « W U T M U C U t t M 
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